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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: GREATER PROTECTION FOR
"INNOCENT" STATE PRISONERS AFTER JACKSON v. VIRGINIA
In Jackson v. Virginia,' the Burger Court recently made an apparent
"about face" with regard to the scope of powers extended to a federal
habeas corpus court reviewing a state court conviction. On the basis of this
ruling, habeas corpus petitioners may now demand federal court examina-
tion of whether the evidence produced at their trials was sufficient tojustify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Jackson is, therefore,
a significant step beyond the Warren Court rule that due process is vio-
lated only when the record is totally devoid of any evidence to support the
conviction .3
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In order to fully appreciate the changes in the law made by Jackson, a
brief review of the history of federal habeas corpus is necessary.' "It is now
well established that the phrase 'habeas corpus' used alone refers to the
common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the 'Great
Writ.' "" In form, "the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, [but]
its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental
rights of personal liberty. '
1. 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). Until this term, Supreme Court watchers could confidently predict
Burger Court behavior in the criminal law arena: the Court could be expected to take a narrow
view of the rights of criminal defendants. In Jackson, that anticipation crumbled. Gunther,
Burger Court: Nine Men Search For What is Right, Regardless of Law, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13,
1979, at 58, col. 3.
2. 99 S. Ct. at 2792; Gunther, supra note 1, at 59, col. 1.
3. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
4. For a detailed discussion of the history of federal habeas corpus, see D. MEADOR, HABEAS
CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALSM OF PowER AND LxmERwy (1968); Bater, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. Rxv. 441 (1963); Brennan,
Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423
(1961); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHi. L. Rv. 142 (1970); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 84 (1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 451 (1966); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive
State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. Rxv. 1315 (1961); Developments in the Law, Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
For a discussion of the history of habeas corpus in Virginia, see Miller and Shepherd, New
Looks at an Ancient Writ: Habeas Corpus Reexamined, 9 U. RICH. L. IRv. 49 (1974).
5. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75, n. 6 (1976) citing Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75,
95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
6. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963). The function of the writ of habeas corpus has been
to:
[Pirovide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolera-
ble restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always
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The United States Constitution does not expressly provide for the writ
of habeas corpus but does provide that "the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."' Congress remedied this omission by making the
writ available to federal prisoners by the Judiciary Act of 1789.8 Not until
1867 did Congress make the writ of habeas corpus available to prisoners
held by state authority? At that time, habeas corpus relief was limited to
"an inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal."'10
The substantive expansion of the Great Writ began with the use of a
be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot
be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is
entitled to immediate release.
Id. at 401-02.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
9. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867). Habeas corpus relief
for state prisoners is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) which reads in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that. . . there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstan-
ces rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction . . ., shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant
shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination is pro-
duced. . . and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record
as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by
the record ....
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) (enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (1948))
amended Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105 (1966) (this section is declara-
tory of existing law *as affirmed by the Supreme Court); see Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114
(1944). Subsections (a) and (d) were part of the amendments made in 1966. Subsection (b)
has remained unchanged from its enactment in 1948.




broad interpretation of the term "jurisdiction."" Despite this initial con-
cession, however, the Court was reluctant to allow habeas corpus to be used
as a writ of error." As a result, a claim of an insufficiency of the evidence
at trial to support the conviction was not a cognizable claim in a habeas
corpus proceeding.'3
In 1915, the Court, in Frank v. Mangum, '4 recognized that violations of
due process of law were reviewable by a federal habeas corpus court,
thereby indicating that nonjurisdictional claims were within the scope of
habeas corpus review. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in
Moore v. Dempsey,"1 by granting a writ of habeas corpus solely on the
grounds of a due process violation. The decisions in Frank and Moore laid
the necessary framework for further substantive expansion of the use of the
Great Writ as evidenced by the opinions in Brown v. Allen" and Fay v.
Noia." After Fay, it was firmly established that a prisoner had the right
to attack a state court conviction by seeking federal habeas corpus review
whenever a federal question was presented."
The extension of the application of habeas corpus to due process viola-
tions led to claims that a conviction based upon evidence insufficient to
support it was a denial of due process of law. In determining what quantum
of evidence was required to meet due process standards, the Court, in
Thompson v. Louisville," stated:
The ultimate question presented to us is whether the charges against peti-
tioner were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render his conviction
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Decision of this question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence,
but on whether this conviction rests upon any evidence at all.2°
11. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
12. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Adams v. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Bowen
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923); Henry v. Henkel, 235
U.S. 219 (1914); Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912);
Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898).
13. Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 430 (1912); Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898);
see generally 39 AM. JuR. 2o, Habeas Corpus § 62 (1968).
14. 237 U.S. 309 (1915)(petition for writ of habeas corpus denied).
15. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
17. 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
18. The Court, in Fay, stated that "It]he course of decisions of this Court from Lange and
Siebold to the present makes plain that restraints contrary to our fundamental law, the
Constitution, may be challenged on federal habeas corpus ..... Id. at 409.
19. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
20. Id. at 200. The Court in Thompson reversed the conviction on the basis that the record
contained no evidence to support it. This holding is referred to as the "no evidence" rule.
1980]
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This "no evidence" rule had been used previously by the Court in civil
cases 2 and in habeas corpus proceedings concerning non-criminal cus-
tody.12 It remained the rule governing claims of insufficiency of the evi-
dence made by state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus review until
the decision in Jackson.21
In 1970, the Supreme Court, in its decision in In re Winship, 24 declared:
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." This decision led to much discussion and divergence of opinion
concerning the relationship between the high degree of proof necessary for
conviction at trial, as dictated by Winship, and the limited scope of evi-
dentiary review by federal habeas corpus courts, as previously dictated by
Thompson. Jackson resolves this conflict by requiring that "in a challenge
to a state criminal conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . . .the
applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the
record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. '2 5 This comment will focus
on the specific facts of Jackson and an analysis of the reasons behind the
Court's ruling, as well as the practical and legal effects of the decision on
the future of federal habeas corpus actions.
See Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973);
Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969);
Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
21. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957)(no evidence of lack
of good moral character); Eagles v. United States, 329 U.S. 304 (1946)(some evidence of
attempting to evade military draft).
22. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S.
131 (1924)(deportation proceedings).
23. For the application of the "no evidence" rule to Virginia state prisoners in habeas
corpus proceedings, see Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Cox, 437
F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1971); Wall v. Superintendent, 418 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1976); Welch
v. Riddle, 402 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Va. 1975); Shrader v. Riddle, 401 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D. Va.
1975); Young v. Paderick, 378 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D. Va. 1974).
24. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
25. 99 S. Ct. at 2792. Jackson was a 5-3 decision, with Justice Powell taking no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist, and Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the decision but expressed serious criticism of the adoption of a new
constitutional rule. Ten states filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
[Vol. 14:455
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II. THE FACTS OF Jackson v. Virginia
James A. Jackson was convicted bf first degree murder26 in a bench trial
in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, Virginia, as a result of the
shooting death of Mary Houston Cole." At trial, Jackson did not deny that
he had shot and killed Mrs. Cole, but he claimed that the shooting was in
self-defense." Jackson also claimed that the State's own evidence indi-
cated that he had been too intoxicated to form the specific intent to kill
required for a conviction of first degree murder under Virginia law.29 This
claim of an insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction was the
central issue in Jackson; therefore, the relevant facts are those concerning
Jackson's degree of intoxication at the time of the shooting."
On the day of Mrs. Cole's death, Jackson began drinking during the
26. The Virginia Code distinguishes the degrees of murder as follows:
Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving,
or by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or
attempt to commit, arson, rape, robbery, burglary or abduction. . . is murder of the
first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony.
All murder other than capital murder and murder in the first degree is murder of
the second degree and is punishable as a Class 3 felony.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
The punishment for conviction of a Class 2 felony is imprisonment for a term of twenty
years to life. Id. § 18.2-10(b). Conviction of a Class 3 felony results in imprisonment for five
to twenty years. Id. § 18.2-10(c).
Murder is defined in Virginia as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought. Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 96 S.E. 801 (1918). Every homicide is
prima facie murder in the second degree, and the burden is on the accused to reduce, and on
the Commonwealth to elevate, the grade of the offense. Perkins v. Commonwealth, 215 Va.
69, 205 S.E.2d 385 (1974); Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 171 S.E.2d 166 (1969).
Premeditation, or specific intent to kill, is an element of first degree murder and its proof by
the prosecution is essential to a conviction of first degree murder. Shiflett v. Commonwealth,
143 Va. 609, 130 S.E. 777 (1925). Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime of which the accused is charged. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
27. 99 S. Ct. at 2784. Mary Houston Cole is hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Cole.
28. Id. at 2785.
29. Id. Voluntary intoxication, while not an affirmative defense to second degree murder,
is relevant to the determination of the ability of the accused to premeditate and form the
specific intent to kill necessary for conviction of first degree murder. If the accused was
sufficiently intoxicated so as to be incapable of premeditation, a conviction of first degree
murder will not lie. See Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 241 S.E.2d 756 (1978); Gills
v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 445, 126 S.E. 51 (1925); Willis v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32
Gratt.) 929 (1879).
30. After being sentenced to thirty years in the Virginia State Penitentiary for first degree
murder, Jackson, by counsel, moved to set aside the verdict as "contrary to the law and
evidence," which motion was denied and an exception noted. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Jackson
v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
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morning and, by early afternoon, he had consumed "several bottles" of
alcoholic beverage .3 About 6:00 p.m. tbat evening, Mrs. Cole picked up
Jackson at her son's home and drove to a local diner for dinner.2 While at
the diner, Mrs. Cole and Jackson were observed by three police officers,
one of whom testified at the trial that Jackson has been "boistrous [sic]"
and "was in a pretty rough condition" as evidenced by his staggering
footsteps and his bloodshot eyes.3 As Jackson and Mrs. Cole prepared to
leave the diner, one of the police officers suggested that Mrs. Cole drive
the car, as she appeared to be less intoxicated than Jackson." Mrs. Cole
then drove herself and Jackson to a secluded church parking lot where they
continued to consume a large quantity of liquor and began "messing
around."3 Later, a struggle ensued between Mrs. Cole and Jackson, result-
ing in the fatal shooting of Mrs. Cole.3
At the conclusion of the evidence presented at Jackson's trial, the prose-
cution declined to seek a conviction for first degree murder because of the
degree of intoxication of Mrs. Cole. 7 However, after expressing the opinion
31. Brief for Petitioner at 3. Evidence produced at the trial indicated that Jackson contin-
ued drinking throughout the afternoon. Id. at 3-4.
32. Brief for Petitioner at 4. Jackson first became acquainted with Mrs. Cole, an employee
of the Chesterfield County Jail, while he was incarcerated there on a disorderly conduct
charge. 99 S. Ct. at 2784. Upon Jackson's release from the Chesterfield County Jail, Mrs. Cole
arranged for him to stay with her son and daughter-in-law. Id.
33. Brief for Petitioner at 4. When asked at trial if Jackson was "loaded," the officer replied
in the affirmative. Id.
34. Brief for Petitioner at 5. Outside the diner, Jackson showed the police officer the gun
he was carrying. The officer offered to keep the gun for him until he sobered up, but Jackson
indicated that this would not be necessary as he and Mrs. Cole were about to engage in sexual
activity. 99 S. Ct. at 2784. Mrs. Cole told the officer that she had a knife in the front seat of
the car. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
35. Brief for Petitioner at 6. This information, as well as the facts relating to the actual
shooting of Mrs. Cole, was obtained from a post-arrest statement made by Jackson which was
read at trial. Id. at 5. In that statement, Jackson remembered that he and Mrs. Cole, while
at the church parking lot, consumed a fifth of Old Crow, a fifth of Wild Turkey, and a pint
of unidentified liquor. Id. at 6. When asked whether he was drunk at the time of the shooting,
Jackson replied that he didn't think he was drunk, but he thought he was "pretty high." 99
S. Ct. at 2785.
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2785. In his post-arrest statement, Jackson claimed that Mrs. Cole had
sought sexual relations with him, which he refused. Id. Jackson stated that Mrs. Cole then
tried to stab him with the knife, that he fired six warning shots into the ground and that after
he reloaded the revolver, Mrs. Cole tried to wrest the gun away from him. He stated that
during that scuffle, two shots were fired, killing Mrs. Cole. Id.
37. Brief for Petitioner at 7. The autopsy report of Mrs. Cole revealed that her blood alcohol
content was 0.17 by weight by volume. Id. In comparison, for the purposes of determining
whether a person was driving while intoxicated, the Virginia Code states that "[i]f there was
...0.10 percent or more by weight by volume of alcohol in the accused's blood, it shall be
presumed that the accused was under the influence of alcohol intoxicants." VA. COD ANN. §
18.2-269(3)(Repl. Vol. 1975).
[Vol. 14:455
1980] FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 461
that if Jackson had been "drunk" he would have been arrested by the
police officers at the diner, the trial court found Jackson guilty of first
degree murder.-"
Following the conviction, Jackson filed a petition for a writ of error in
the Supreme Court of Virginia on the ground that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the conviction." The petition and writ were refused, "the
effect of which [was] to affirm the judgment of the [trial] court."40 Jack-
son then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, again on the ground that
the evidence of premeditation was insufficient to support a conviction of
first degree murder." The District Court, applying the "no evidence" rule
of Thompson, found the record totally devoid of evidence of premeditation
and granted the writ."2 The State of Virginia appealed the order granting
a writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the District Court's judgment. 3
Jackson's petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court. Upon consideration of the merits, the Court held
that a federal habeas corpus court must consider whether there was suffi-
cient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but that even under this new standard, Jackson's con-
38. Brief for Petitioner at 7.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 2785.
40. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent by the State of California at B-i, Jackson v.
Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). See also, Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421
(1974) where that court held that "the Due Process Clause . . .does not require that the
petitioner be granted a writ of error as a matter of right. . . .[A] decision to grant or refuse
a petition for writ of error is based upon one equally-applied criterion-the merits of the
case." Id. at 423-24.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 2785. The opinion of the District Court is unreported.
42. 99 S. Ct. at 2785. The District Court based its decision to grant the writ of habeas
corpus on testimony attesting to the fact that Jackson was intoxicated, on the lack of antago-
nism between Mrs. Cole and Jackson shortly before the shooting occurred, and on the lack
of bruises and lacerations on the body of Mrs. Cole after the shooting. Appendix at 25-27,
Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
43. 99 S. Ct. at 2785. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is unreported. The Court of
Appeals reached the decison to reverse the District Court's judgment based upon the facts
that Jackson had reloaded his gun after firing six warning shots, that he had time to do so,
and that Mrs. Cole was shot twice. These facts were held to show some evidence that Jackson
intended to shoot Mrs. Cole. Id. at 2786. While premeditation is an essential element of first
degree murder in Virginia, it need not exist for an appreciable period of time. The require-
ment of premeditation is met as long as the necessary intention exists immediately before
the fatal blow is struck. Hairston v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 429, 230 S.E.2d 626 (1976); Akers
v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 216 S.E.2d 28 (1975); Shiflett v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 609,
130 S.E. 777 (1925).
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viction for first degree murder must be affirmed."
III. ANALYSIS OF Jackson
The new standard of review adopted by the Court in Jackson was based
squarely on its opinion in In re Winship.45 The Court recognized that the
Thompson "no evidence" rule did not provide constitutionally adequate
review of insufficiency of the evidence claims after the ruling in Winship. "
In Winship, the Court recognized that the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt "'plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure,'" because it gives " 'concrete substance' to the presumption of
innocence," insuring against unjust convictions. 7 Under the Thompson
rule, "a mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a 'no evidence' standard";"
"[b]ut it could not seriously be argued that such a 'modicum' of evidence
could support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt."4 As a result of the
Court's analysis of the constitutional framework of Thompson and
Winship, it is apparent that the "no evidence" rule "fails to supply a
workable or even a predictable standard for determining whether the due
process command of Winship has been honored."5
44. 99 S. Ct. at 2792-93. The State of Virginia filed a petition for a rehearing on the new
standard announced by the Court. This petition was denied on October 1, 1979. 100 S. Ct.
195 (1979).
45. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
46. In Jackson, the Court noted that "a person cannot incur the loss of liberty without
notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend," and that "[a] meaningful opportunity to
defend . . . presumes as well that a total want of evidence to support a charge will conclude
the case in favor of the accused." 99 S. Ct. at 2786-87. Consequently, the Thompson "no
evidence" rule "secures to an accused the most elemental of due process rights: freedom from
a wholly arbitrary deprivation of liberty." Id. at 2787.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2787, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See generally Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895). See also Allen,
The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1977); Jefferies and Stephan, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burdens of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1071-77 (1968); Under-
wood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Crimina-Cases, 86 YALE
L.J. 1299 (1977).
48. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964)(Warren, C.J., dissenting). "Any evidence
that is relevant-that has the tendency to make the existence of an element of a crime slightly
more probable than it would be without the evidence, cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 401-could be
deemed a 'mere modicum.'" 99 S. Ct. at 2790.
49. 99 S. Ct. at 2790. The Court in Jackson expressed apprehension that, under the
Thompson rule, a defendant whose conviction is founded upon little, albeit some evidence,
will be denied habeas corpus relief even though his conviction may be in violation of Winship,
while another defendant, whose conviction is founded upon overwhelming evidence, may be




The approach taken by the Court in Jackson was not totally unantici-
pated. In United States v. Amato,5' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, on direct review of a federal criminal conviction, had held that the
Winship standard applied in determining whether there was sufficient
evidence at the trial to submit the case to the jury. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit recently recognized the possible impact of Winship
on federal habeas corpus review, holding that a rational trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2 In his dissent
to a denial of certiorari in Freeman v. Zahradnick,53 Justice Stewart es-
poused the application of Winship to sufficiency of the evidence claims
raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings. In fact, the dissent in Freeman
is substantially incorporated into the majority opinion in Jackson.
The tendency of Burger Court decisions" to limit the expansion of fed-
eral habeas corpus initiated by the Warren Court" is not followed in
Jackson. A comparison of the nature of the claims of constitutional error
advanced in those decisions limiting the expansion of federal habeas cor-
pus with the nature of the claim of constitutional error made in Jackson
may provide some insight into the apparent inconsistency of the Burger
Court.
In Estelle v. Williams,5" Francis v. Henderson,51 and Wainwright v.
51. 495 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord, United States v. Jeffords, 491 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Harris, 441
F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1971). These cases illustrate the effect of Winship on direct appellate
review of criminal convictions.
52. Spruytte v. Koehler, 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1979) (unpublished opinion). See also Speig-
ner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'g 450 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
53. 429 U.S. 1111 (1977)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
55. E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
56. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The petitioner sought collateral relief on the basis that he was
denied due process of law because he was tried while wearing prison clothing. In denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court noted that no objection to the clothing had
been made during petitioner's trial despite the fact that petitioner's counsel was aware of the
clothing as it was expressly referred to by counsel during voir dire. Id. at 509-510. The Court
expressed the view that, although the State cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a
jury while dressed in prison clothes, the failure to make an objection, for tactical or other
reasons, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitu-
tional violation. Id. at 512-13.
57. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). The petitioner alleged that his conviction for felony murder was
void due to the unconstitutional exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury which indicted him.
The Court, in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, noted that the petitioner had
not raised this claim prior to trial and that this failure constituted a waiver of that claim
under state law. Id. at 537. Applying the rule of Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973),
which denied habeas corpus review of such a claim made by a federal prisoner, the Court
1980]
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Sykes,5" federal habeas corpus relief was denied to state prisoners on the
ground that, in each case, the petitioners had failed to make a timely
objection to an alleged error in their trials; therefore, petitioners had
waived their rights to raise such questions in a collateral proceeding. Ab-
sent from these cases is any showing of a "colorable claim of innocence."',
Rather, constitutional error was alleged on technical procedural grounds."
In Stone v. Powell, 6, the petitioner asserted that his conviction wag based
on evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure. The ques-
tion presented to the Court was:
[W]hether state prisoners-who have been afforded the opportunity for full
and fair consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with re-
spect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial and on direct review-may
invoke their claim again on federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to
be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of
extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims."2
Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, expressed a concern that appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule diverts attention from the "ultimate ques-
tion of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal
proceeding," thereby deflecting the truth finding process and often freeing
the guilty. 3 Also, "the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically
expressed that, absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice, considerations of comity and
federalism required that the Davis rule be applied to state prisoners as well. Id. at 542.
58. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). A state prisoner failed to make a timely objection, under a state
contemporaneous-objection rule, to the admission of his inculpatory statements at trial. At
the trial, there was no challenge to the admission of his statements on the ground that he
did not understand the warnings read to him in compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). Id. at 90-91. The Court ruled that, in the absence of a showing of cause for
the noncompliance with the state's procedural rules and an affirmative showing of actual
prejudice, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. Id.
59. Friendly, supra note 4, at 142.
60. There has been much discussion on the appropriateness of holding counsel's acts, or
failure to act, as a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant or as binding on the
defendant to preclude further review of his claims. For discussion of these areas, see Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YAL
L.J. 1179 (1975); Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on De-
fense Services, 12 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 667 (1975); Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation
in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rav. 927 (1973); Cover and
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977);
Wice and Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs: A National Survey and
Analysis, 10 CPum. L. BuLL. 161 (1974).
61. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
62. Id. at 489. The exclusionary rule dictates that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search and seizure shall be excluded from admission at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
63. 428 U.S. at 490.
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reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.""4 Justice Powell noted that while the exclu-
sionary rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity by nurturing re-
spect for fourth amendment values, indiscriminate application of the rule
may well generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.6 5
In rejecting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court reasoned
that the furtherance of fourth amendment goals would be outweighed by
the overall detrimental effect to the criminal justice system.6
In contrast to these earlier Burger Court decisions, the habeas corpus
petitioner in Jackson alleged that he had been denied due process because
the evidence produced at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction
of first degree murder. 7 Petitioner Jackson did not deny or challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of second degree mur-
der.6" In short, Jackson advanced constitutional error in "a colorable claim
of innocence." 9
The idea that the scope of the writ of habeas corpus should revolve
around the concept of a claim of innocence was first articulated in Justice
Black's dissent in Kaufman v. United States,7" in which he said:
[I] agreed with Fay v. Noia as one of the bright landmarks in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice. But I did not think then and do not think now
that it laid down an inflexible rule compelling the courts to release every
prisoner who alleges in collateral proceedings some constitutional flaw, re-
gardless of its nature, regardless of his guilt or innocence, and regardless of
the circumstances of the case. The Court's opinion in Noia shows, from
beginning to end, that the defendant's guilt or innocence is at least one of
the vital considerations in determining whether collateral relief should be
available to a convicted defendant.7
Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also advanced the
thesis that "with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject
to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional
plea with a colorable claim of innocence."7 Judge Friendly asserted that
collateral attack carries a serious burden of justification in light of its
64. Id.
65. Id. at 491.
66. Id. at 494.
67. 99 S. Ct. at 2786.
68. Id.
69. Friendly, supra note 4, at 142.
70. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
71. Id. at 235-36 (Black, J., dissenting).
72. Friendly, supra note 4, at 142. The four exceptions where habeas corpus is justified
irrespective of the claim of innocence are: (1) where the tribunal lacked jurisdiction or where
the criminal process itself broke down so that the defendant did not receive a fair trial as
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inherent problems, and that notions of finality do have a place where
constitutional error is alleged and there is no question of guilt."
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,7 '
also expressed concern for the issue of innocence in federal habeas corpus,
especially in fourth amendment claims:
Habeas corpus review of search and seizure claims thus brings a deficiency
of our system of criminal justice into sharp focus: a convicted defendant
asserting no constitutional claim bearing on innocence and relying solely on
an alleged unlawful search, is now entitled to federal habeas [corpus] review
of state conviction and the likelihood of release if the reviewing court con-
cludes that the search was unlawful.75
Justice Powell reaffirmed this view in Stone v. Powell.7"
From the opinion in Stone and the decision reached by the Court in
Jackson, it appears that the Burger Court is expressing a tendency toward
expansion of "truth-furthering rights" and the limiting of "truth-
obstructing rights" in the treatment of habeas corpus petitions." "Truth-
furthering rights" are those that "foster sound guilt/innocence determina-
tions with the requisite degree of certainty."78 "Truth-obstructing rights"
are those which tend to deflect the truth finding process, such as the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule." The requirement espoused in Thompson
that conviction be based on some evidence of guilt was a step in the "truth-
furthering" direction, as was the requirement that due process of law man-
dates that each element of a crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
expressed in Winship."0 The Jackson decision, indicating a concern for the
just determination of guilt or innocence is, therefore, not a radical depar-
ture from the values espoused in Stone.
Jackson, however, is not without criticism. The concurring opinion ex-
pressed grave doubts regarding the majority's conclusion that the new
guaranteed by the Constitution; (2) where the denial of a constitutional right is claimed on
the basis of facts outside the record and only collateral attack can vindicate the claim; (3)
where the state has failed to provide a proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on
appeal; and (4) when new constitutional developments relating to criminal procedure are
announced and are retroactive. Id. at 150-53, as set out in McFelly, Habeas Corpus and Due
Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 533, 554 (1976).
73. Friendly, supra note 4, at 146, 149; McFeely, supra note 72, at 554.
74. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
75. Id. at 258 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. See notes 61-66 supra and accompanying text.
77. Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 60, at 1092.
78. Id.




standard of habeas corpus review was compelled by Winship."1 "[An
examination of Winship reveals that it has nothing to do with appellate,
much less habeas corpus, review standards." 2 In contrast to Jackson, the
facts of Winship presented "a case where the choice of the standard of
proof has made a difference: the juvenile court judge below forthrightly
acknowledged that he believed by a preponderance of the evidence, but
was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt," of the juvenile's guilt.
Since the adoption of the new standard was not necessary to the determi-
nation of Jackson, the decision was described by the concurring Justices
as "an unwise act of lawmaking," 4 and "adopted simply to forestall some
hypothetical evil that has not been demonstrated.",
Jackson may not present facts that point out the deficiencies of the "no
evidence" rule. However, the facts in Freeman, as related by Justice Mar-
shall in his dissent to the denial of certiorari, show that there are instances
in which there is some evidence to support the conviction, yet the Winship
standard is not complied with in the trial court. 8 The holding in Jackson,
therefore, provides greater constitutional protection to arguably innocent
criminal defendants by adding support to the ruling in Winship.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF Jackson
The major substantive effect of Jackson is that a state prisoner is now
assured that, even if the trier of fact misapplies the standard of Winship,
his conviction will not be affirmed on habeas corpus review without evi-
dence to support it beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson also illustrates
that the Burger Court is more sensitive to petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus when there is a claim of innocence than when technical procedural
error is alleged.u
The practical implications of Jackson are more diverse. As in any case
which expands the review capacity of the federal courts, there are fears of
a flood of new petitions and the consequent added workload on the already
81. 99 S. Ct. at 2793 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2795.
83. 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring).
84. 99 S. Ct. at 2793 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 2794.
86. 429 U.S. 1111, 1116-18 (1977)(Marshall, J., dissenting). A review of the facts of other
cases in which convictions were affirmed under the "no evidence" rule may offer examples
of the need for the standard adopted by the Court in Jackson.
87. 99 S. Ct. at 2792.
88. See Cobb, The Search for a New Equilibrium in Habeas Corpus Review: Resolution of
Conflicting Values, 32 U. Msu L. REv. 637 (1978); Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 60, at
1086; Friendly, supra note 4, at 142; McFeely, supra note 72, at 533.
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overburdened district courts. 9 The majority responded to these fears by
expressing that "a more stringent standard will expand the contours of this
type of claim, but will not create an entirely new class of cases cognizable
on federal habeas corpus.""0 The Court also noted that "this type of claim
can almost always be judged on the written record without need for an
evidentiary hearing in the federal court."'"
Involved, also, are questions of comity and the states' desire to adjudi-
cate fully and finally their own criminal cases. An increase in the scope of
federal review of state convictions inevitably leads to increased tension
between the state and federal judiciaries. 2 However, the majority in
Jackson indicates that most meritorious claims of insufficiency of the evi-
dence will be handled by the state appellate process, but that "[ilt is the
occasional abuse that the federal writ of habeas corpus stands ready to
correct.""
Of more concern, perhaps, is the desire for finality of criminal cases and
the economic allocation of judicial resources. It has been asserted that
there comes a point in the review process at which the law of diminishing
returns applies: although there is a strong desire to determine truth, repeti-
tious review may well undermine that goal by imposing on the judicial
system countless hours of unproductive labor spent on meritless claims.
One commentator has pointed out the effects of duplicative processes on
the art of judging:
I could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility,
of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the
difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of
the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else. Of course
this does not mean that we should not have appeals . . . . What seems so
objectionable is second-guessing merely for the sake of second-guessing, in
the service of the illusory notion that if we only try hard enough we will find
the "truth." 5
One other important result of the lack of finality of criminal convictions
is seen in the rehabilitation process. It has been argued that rehabilitation
of the criminal cannot begin until he is assured that his case is closed and
89. 99 S. Ct. at 2798 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2791.
91. Id.
92. See generally Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tension Between State and
Federal Courts, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 660 (1970).
93. 99 S. Ct. at 2791.
94. Bator, supra note 4, at 451. See 99 S. Ct. at 2799 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. Bator, supra note 4, at 451.
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that there is no avenue left open for his premature release. 8 While the
Court recognized the problems of finality in criminal proceedings,
"deprivation of liberty through the invocation of the criminal sanction is
simply not to be achieved at the expense of a constitutional right."97
V. CONCLUSION
The "open door" habeas corpus policy of the Warren Court has been
trimmed by the Burger Court to a "conditional open door" policy. Jackson,
as well as Stone, illustrates that a claim of innocence is a vital condition
to receiving federal habeas corpus review. Claims of innocence based on
an insufficiency of the evidence are no longer measured by the "no evi-
dence" rule of Thompson, but are now gauged by the standard of Winship.
As a result, Jackson provides greater protection for the arguably innocent
state criminal defendant.
Jennie L. Montgomery
96. Id. at 452.
97. 99 S. Ct. at 2791.
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